# Signing Keys

> The public keys Thoth signs decision receipts and evidence packs with, and how to check that a key is Thoth's.

Source: https://docs.atensecurity.com/docs/operations/signing-keys

Thoth signs every decision receipt, and every evidence pack manifest, with keys held in AWS KMS.
The two use separate keys, so a leaked pack key cannot forge a receipt. To check a receipt, or an
evidence pack, you need to know the signing key is Thoth's. A key that arrives inside the evidence proves
nothing on its own: whoever built the evidence could have put their own key there. Check it against
the fingerprints published here instead.

## Published keys

| Purpose | Algorithm | SHA-256 fingerprint of the DER public key |
|---|---|---|
| Decision receipts | ECDSA P-384, SHA-384 | `2fc493a13e99dd111a0b52b7f549b9b0f0a56b6784afeb885d78d6ec3da52e8e` |
| Evidence packs | ECDSA P-384, SHA-384 | `b519b27edb0a729e9e9b87a9d1ae8bfe397da7ba279b11ca58c806565461e403` |

The same list, with each public key in PEM, is published as JSON at
[`https://docs.atensecurity.com/signing-keys.json`](/signing-keys.json).

## Check a key

`thothctl` has the list built in. Print it and compare it with this page:

```bash
thothctl evidence trusted-keys
```

To fingerprint a public key yourself, hash its DER bytes:

```bash
openssl pkey -pubin -in key.pem -outform DER | shasum -a 256
```

## Rotation

When a key is rotated, the old key's fingerprint stays on this list, marked retired, for as long as
evidence it signed is retained, so older evidence still verifies.
